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the principle of elimination, the need of being nursed. Homesickness is due to the disturbance of fixed paths of habituation. As a further confirmation of the hypothesis of the mnemonic nature of the affective tendencies Ribot's principle of *transfert* is utilized.

In accordance with this principle, in itself of mnemonic origin, all affectivities not directly traceable to a mnemonic source are derived from those which are thus referable, and are therefore of indirect mnemonic origin, *e. g.*, secondary sex affectivities, cruelty as an end in itself, derived from the original tendency of tearing prey to satisfy hunger, the desire of victory for itself, originally self defence, the desire of amassing wealth, which is a transfer from the original simple impulse to satisfy hunger plus the intellectual element of foreseeing its recurrence.

Emotions according to this theory "are only sudden and intensive modes of putting in action those accumulated energies, which constitute precisely the affective tendencies." Emotions and affective tendencies are distinguished from each other by the fact that the same affective tendency may, under different circumstances, give rise to very diverse emotions; to emotions of different intensities or even, in some cases, to no emotion at all in the proper sense of the word, *e. g.*, the affective tendency of a dog for his piece of meat may be translated, according to circumstances, into flight, anger, or merely a search for a quiet place in which to enjoy it. As all affective tendencies result in movement, external or internal, the theory is here in accord with that of Ribot and the Lange-James theory.

The will is only an affective tendency inhibiting or impelling to action like every other affective tendency. As to pleasure and pain, the theory is in accord with that which interprets pleasure as the subjective accompaniment of unimpeded activity and pain as due to its inhibition.

THEODATE L. SMITH

A Text Book of Psychology. E. B. TITCHENER. Macmillan Company, New York, 1910. pp. xx + 565.

Professor Titchener in the present volume has given us more than a text-book of psychology. The book comes fairly close to being a brief, systematic psychology—an earnest, certainly, of what the author will give us when his more complete study is ready. At the present time, in English, we have at our disposal many elementary texts on psychology, and many elementary laboratory manuals; but we are poverty-stricken for advanced works in general, systematic psychology (based step by step on experiment), and for advanced experimental manuals on the various sense-fields,—attention, association, etc. Titchener's book, while supposed to be for elementary students, is far from being an easy text. Indeed, the author's own way of thinking has become so much more complex since the writing of the *Outline* that I doubt if he himself clearly realizes just how much of his more recondite reflections have become incorporated in the book. If I were seeking a quarrel with the Text-book I should find the grounds for it on the score of too great complexity. It is a little heavy for the average junior or senior. But psychological classes differ greatly in the different institutions. In some, psychology is required; in others, elective. In some the "quarter" system is in vogue, and only one quarter is allotted to psychology; in others, psychology runs the year through. It is doubtful whether Titchener's book can be adapted to meet the requirements of a short course. In institutions where the elective system is in operation, and where a full year can be given to psychology, I know of no text better to use than the one under discussion. In view of the fact that the author introduces experiments everywhere and that he discusses methods and results the book lends itself easily both to systematic and to experimental presentation. Any student going carefully over the work with a competent instructor will come out at the end of the year with an increased respect for psychology and with the

ability to think along psychological lines and to read and follow the future progress of psychology even if he carries his training no further.

In a book which is so full of factual material, we cannot hope in a review to discuss chapter and verse in any adequate way. Certain interesting points of view developed by the author, alone can be discussed. In the first place, Titchener's series of chapters on sensation is excellent—by far the best treatment we have. For, in addition to the full treatment of the ordinary laws and principles involved in sensation, we have the more recondite phenomena touched upon. Much additional material over that treated in the *Outline* appears. For example, we have a fuller treatment of color-theories; of the vestibular and ampullar senses; of the sensitivity of the abdominal tissue; of sensations arising from the digestive and urinary systems; and from the circulatory and respiratory system.

In discussing the attributes of sensation in general, the author tells us that there are four distinct attributes; quality, intensity, clearness and duration. The reviewer is puzzled by the attribute *clearness*. We all admit clearness as an attribute of complex conscious experience, but not as a fundamental aspect of the sensation-process—not in the sense in which duration and intensity are attributes. He says, "Clearness, again, is the attribute which gives the sensation its particular place in consciousness; the clearer sensation is dominant, independent, outstanding; the less clear sensation is subordinate, undistinguished in the background of consciousness." This is certainly to be admitted, but surely what Titchener is writing of here is an attention-state, in which a given "sensation" is focal, while others appear in what James calls the "fringe." In other words, clearness is one of the descriptive words which we apply to perceptual, ideational and other complex mental states. With this given as an attribute of sensation one would expect to find it taken account of somewhere along with the other attributes of sensation. But in his chapters on the special senses he speaks only of the usual attributes of each group, introducing certain changes in terminology, to be sure, as for example, he speaks now of the qualitative attributes of a color as being hue, tint and chroma.¹ And further, in audition, he speaks of size and diffusion as an attribute of tone. It would seem in places that he means to use this attribute of clearness in the same sense as we should use *clearness* in describing a perceptual state; but this would carry with it the inference, it seems to me, that sensation is something more than an abstraction—something that can actually present itself. Furthermore, in order to realize the conditions for the appearance of clearness, we should have to have at least two such "sensation processes" attempting to run their courses simultaneously. But this is certainly the process which we know as perception. The confusion, if I understand Titchener's statements, is similar to that found in James where sensation is at times discussed as an abstraction and at others as a process correlative with perception.

It is interesting to note that he treats of the sense-image under the general chapter heading of synesthesia; since the image is the normal process, and synesthesia the anomalous one, we should suppose that the traditional order of treatment were best. One would hardly begin a chapter on color vision for elementary students with a discussion of red-green blindness. His early discussion of imagery is rather disappointing. Only two pages are given over to it. One finds there few statements concerning the experimental mode of investigating the image, and very little of individual differences. This lack of emphasis of the image in an early place would seem to be a real limitation in the use of the book as a text. The average undergraduate rarely wakes up to real introspective interest in psychological problems until he has learned that he has imagery and can stand

¹ His introduction of the words chroma and tint are of doubtful value, since the word saturation, now in common use, seems adequate.

off and look at it, as it were, in the absence of a perceptual world. A brief study of the image awakens him far more rapidly than does a much longer drill on sensation-processes. Later on in the book, however, the author completes the treatment of imagery under the headings, association, memory and imagination. Here the treatment is full and adequate.

Following the chapter on synesthesia is one on the intensity of sensation, which includes a discussion of mental measurement, liminal and terminal stimuli, just noticeable differences, and Weber's law. The chapter is concise, but clear, and since these topics are valuable to the student, such a chapter is a real contribution on the pedagogical side.

Then follows the chapter on affection. He stands by his position stated in the *Outline*. "The writer holds that there is an elementary affective process; a feeling element. . . ." "He holds further that there are only two kinds or qualities of affection, pleasantness and unpleasantness." Although the reviewer thinks he finds himself in another 'camp,' it gives him a sense of security to find a psychologist of Titchener's eminence who admits his position so frankly on such a vexed question as that of affection. On page 228, in a discussion of the relation between sensation and affection, he again enumerates the attributes of sensation—*quality, intensity, clearness, duration*. Those of affection on the other hand, are *quality, intensity, duration*. On page 231, he uses clearness as the distinguishing criterion between sensation and affection. "Pleasantness and unpleasantness may be intensive and lasting, but they are never clear." This is due, in short, the author says, to our inability to *attend* to an affection. "The lack of the attribute of clearness is sufficient in itself to differentiate affection from sensation. . . ." Again, this attribute of clearness attaching to sensation and not to affection, and further the fact that we cannot attend to affection, make the author reject the view that affection is really a complex or fusion of the accompanying organic sensations. While there is no time to argue the question, I cannot see that Titchener makes his point against this latter view. If we should grant his premises, namely, that affection lacks clearness, and that it cannot be attended to, we should be forced to admit his point. But these are just the questions at issue.

He discusses two methods of investigating affection: that of "paired comparison," and the method of "expression." He devotes about six pages to the method of expression, but is in agreement with the majority of psychologists in denying any great usefulness to it. It seems like a useless luxury in a text-book to treat so at length of a method which has absolutely nothing to recommend it. The tridimensional theory of feeling is well and critically discussed.

Space does not permit of even a brief review of further chapters; attention, perception, association, memory and imagination, action, emotion, and thought. The chapters on attention and on thought are striking and are both readable and teachable.

In the chapter on action it is with a shock that one again meets with his earlier expressed view that the first movements of organisms were conscious movements (agreeing thus with Wundt, Ward and Cope). According to this view, voluntary action degenerates into ideo-motor or sensory-motor action, and then into the reflex. But in animal life we find two kinds of responses, in every organism, beginning with the protozoa (as shown by the recent work of Gibbs and Smith, of Bentley and others): the one type being fixed and definite; the other diffuse, leading itself to habit-formation. Certainly I should agree with Titchener that consciousness is as old as life, but I should certainly connect consciousness with the diffuse type of response. I should say further that *the very first organism started with both types of response*. Surely nothing is gained, and confusion is introduced by the conception of Titchener that all movement was first a voluntary acquisition, and that only later do we begin to find fixity

in the responses of organisms. There is not a scintilla of evidence that *fixed* and automatic reactions do not appear with the first appearance of organisms. And there is abundant reason to say that each new species as it appears, *e. g.*, by mutation (see the work of Tower *et al.*), gives evidence of a reflex repertoire and of a plastic repertoire. Titchener argues that the reason we do not see this complete plasticity (which would be called for on his theory) in the unicellular form to-day, is that the protozoa have travelled all the way from plasticity to fixity.

Looking at the book as a whole, it seems to the reviewer that in many places Titchener has adhered too rigidly to the introspective method. Surely in his treatment of *meaning* he could have leaned advantageously a little way toward the functional side, without giving up the guiding principles of the book. Nevertheless in this day when, if I can read the signs aright, the pendulum is swinging another way—toward a study of life-situations as a whole, and the adequacy, permanency and different types of adjustment which such situations call forth—Titchener gives us an enviable example of a man unafraid of his own views of the problems of psychology, and of his own methods of solving them. JOHN B. WATSON

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L'année psychologique, publ. par A. BINET, avec la collaboration de LARGUIER DES BANCELS et Dr. TH. SIMON, etc. Seizième année. Paris, Masson et Cie. 1910, pp. ix, 500.

The introduction reviews the progress of psychology in 1909, treating especially the work on thought and on pathological states, and the work in experimental pedagogy and judicial psychology. The first original contribution, by A. Binet, is entitled "The physical signs of intelligence in children." Greater or less degrees of correlation are found between intelligence and size of head, the so-called signs of degeneracy (abnormally shaped head, ears, etc.), facial expression, and hands. The habit of biting the finger-nails is found to be without significance in this respect. The correlations found hold in general only for the group, not always for the individual. The physical signs are useful for confirming, rather than for making, estimates of intellectual level. Next in order is an examination of the art of Rembrandt, by A. and A. Binet. The authors attempt to show how, by avoiding extremes of contrast and by accentuating unity of lighting, Rembrandt has succeeded in giving those impressions of distance, of unity, and of light which characterize his work. "Tachistoscopic Researches," by B. Bourdon, is an investigation of the times of choice-reactions made by observers to whom colors, rectangles of different lengths and figures, have been tachistoscopically exposed. The writer measures the time of reactions involving judgments of resemblance, identification, localization, comparison, or combinations of these processes. The eight following papers, by A. Binet and Th. Simon, are concerned with defining the various mental derangements. Up to the present, the authors believe, definitions have been too inclusive and general, have failed to show the *essential* characteristic which marks off the disorder, and have been couched in terms only partly psychological. They themselves classify the derangements as (1) hysteria, (2) derangement with knowledge (fears, impulses, etc.), (3) manic-depressive insanity, (4) systematized insanity (paranoia), (5) the dementias (general paresis, senile dementia, dementia praecox), and (6) subnormality. They consider the history of the conceptions of the various disorders, the theories propounded and the attempts at definition. They also review the characteristic mental states, symptoms, and attitudes of patients, both as reported by others, and as shown by the new data here published. They compare the special derangement under consideration with the other types of derangement, and finally arrive at a conclusion as to its essential character. Of hysteria, they find character-